眾律國際法律事務所

為維護我國人民及業者權益，並確保我國金融市場秩序及有效監督管理，電子支付機構管理條例規定，境外機構非依本條例申請許可設立電子支付機構，不得於我國境內經營電子支付機構業務。故境外機構若想在我國經營電子支付之業務，則需依本條例相關規定申請許可設立電子支付機構（須為本國公司，非外國公司之分公司），而當境外機構依本條例申請許可設立股份有限公司組織（我國法規規定電子支付機構以股份有限公司組織為限）之電子支付機構後，該設立之電子支付機構性質上就已經屬於本國公司，而不再是境外機構。

為確保我國金融市場秩序及有效監督管理，非經主管機關核准，任何人不得有與境外機構合作或協助其於我國境內從事電子支付機構業務之相關行為。對此，為明確規範主管機關核准之對象、條件、應檢具書件、與境外機構合作或協助其於我國境內從事電子支付機構業務相關行為之範圍與方式、作業管理及其他應遵行事項，金管會訂有《與境外機構合作或協助境外機構於我國境內從事電子支付機構業務相關行為管理辦法》，以利相關業者遵循相關法令[1]。若電子機構最近一年有違反金融相關法規或處理消費金融爭議不妥適而受主管機關處分或糾正，且尚未依金管會之要求作出具體改善，則不符合申請與境外機構合作之資格。

另外，依本辦法第6條，與境外機構合作須先向金管會申請核准，並取得核准函後，始得辦理。而金管會為核准前，應先詢問中央銀行意見。

而對於經核准機構擬合作或協助之境外機構，該辦法要求須符合下列條件：

一、最低實收資本額達等值新臺幣五千萬元。但經主管機關同意者，不在此限。

二、經營相當於本條例所定電子支付機構業務達一年以上。

三、最近三年無重大違反當地政府之相關法令。

四、其他經主管機關規定之條件[2]。

至於中國大陸地區，因目前中國大陸地區尚未開放境外機構投資，以及金管會表示中資來台投資勢必要重啟談判，故有關中國大陸地區欲申請許可及任何人與中國大陸地區支付機構合作等，應依兩岸人民關係條例處理

不論是代理收付實質交易款項，或是收受儲值款項，第三方支付（為配合我國法規，本文以下統一稱作電子支付）牽涉大筆資金之流動，為了保障使用者權益，提供安全便利的資金移轉服務，對於電子支付機構之成立以及管制監理須有完善之規範，針對電子支付機構設立之申請與許可我國立法者於《電子支付機構管理條例》中制定有相關規範，以下將對此作簡單介紹。

電子支付機構目前於台灣僅容許以股份有限公司之形式成立[1]，不可以有限公司、無限公司作為公司組織。

由於電子交易涉及大量金流事項處理，為確保電子支付機構有能力執行業務、確保具有健全之財務狀況、完善風險控管等，針對設立之資本額有所規範，原則上要求電子支付構之最低實收資本額為新臺幣5億元，若僅經營「代理收付實質交易款項」業務者得例外放寬最低實收資本額要求為新臺幣1億元符合規定，以維持業務之穩定與安全運作。

另外，考量未來社會經濟變遷及業務實際需要，金管會得視情況及實際需要調整最低實收資本額。當電子支付機構的實收資本額沒有達到規定金額時，金管會應該要限期命該機構辦理增資；金管會得就沒有在期限內完成增資的電子支付機構勒令其停業[2]。

電子支付機構之業務範圍，除實質交易款項之代理收付外，尚包括預先吸收社會大眾資金之收受儲值款項及非基於實質交易之電子支付帳戶間款項移轉等，已涉及金融特許業務之辦理，為維護金融市場秩序與安定及保障社會大眾權益，立法者將其規範為「許可制」，並規定不得經營未經主管機關核定之業務。

TRF爭議解決機制／李怡仙律師、陳雅鈴實習律師、胡芮萍實習律師

據報載，近來驚傳多家銀行拒絕TRF客戶申請以仲裁機制調處，金管會為此火速發函至銀行公會，要求銀行公會通令各銀行不得拒絕客戶提出仲裁請求以解決TRF爭議，若報載內容屬實，此可謂金管會近期為處理TRF爭議在台灣可能造成的空前動盪，所採取之非常措施。

TRF屬於金管會所定義的複雜性高風險的衍生性金融商品，之所以被認為「複雜性高風險」，是因為其中隱念了賣出選擇權，且結算或比價期數超過三期，原則上只有專業型投資人才具有操作的能力。簡言之，TRF之交易方式為銀行與客戶對「未來匯率走勢」進行對賭，對於客戶來說獲利有限，但若匯率不如預期走勢時，損失將可能無限擴大，尤以104年8月間人民幣大幅重貶時最為嚴重。

　　因為不少中小企業當初在簽訂TRF合約時，是以該企業之店面、廠房等不動產作為擔保品，而臺灣經濟之穩定與成長，與中小企業靈活調整、較強之應變力或彈性有極大的關係，如今遭受鉅額損失的中小企業竟高達近3900家，使得許多中小企業之營運產生嚴重的影響，因虧損擴大被銀行強制平倉，其鉅額虧損被銀行又轉成貸款，或被銀行說服轉買其他TRF商品而演變為以債養債，使得許多無力還款的中小企業正陷入生死關頭，對於經濟秩序之衝擊不容小覷。

　　故如何有效且正確地解決TRF爭議，為銀行與客戶目前極度關注之問題，就TRF爭議約有四大解決方式，與銀行直接協商、評議機制、交付仲裁以及對銀行提起訴訟，以下將分由此四大解決方式進行說明。

一、        與銀行直接協商

對此部份，由於每家銀行處理態度都不太一樣，有的銀行掌握客戶較多擔保品，該銀行可能比較傾向個別協商；反之，掌握擔保品或客戶財務資料比較少的，就表示要所有的銀行聯合起來共同與客戶協商，不願單獨協商。

二、        評議機制

為公平合理、迅速有效處理金融消費爭議，以保護金融消費者權益，設有爭議處理機構即財團法人金融消費評議中心。當金融消費者與金融服務業發生金融消費爭議時，先向金融服務業申訴，金融消費者應於30日內為適當之處理。若金融消費者不接受處理結果者或金融服務業逾上述期限不為處理者，金融消費者得於收受處理結果或期限屆滿之日起60內，向評議中心申請評議。金融消費者拒絕評議決定，評議不成立。

我國於2015年1月16日經立法院三讀通過《電子支付機構管理條例》，也就是一般所稱的第三方支付專法，自2015年5月3日起施行，主管機關為金管會。第1條揭示條例制定之目的在於「促進電子支付機構健全經營及發展、提供安全便利之資金移轉服務」。第三方支付之起源主要是因為網路購物、拍賣興起，隨之而來面臨看不見的貨品以及消費者與網路業者間缺發信任感，小商家以及個人無法收受信用卡[1]等等因素，因而產生由中介機構代為收款付款的第三方支付機制。所謂「第三方支付服務，主要透過第三方支付業者的資金能力提供給使用者相當程度的交易擔保，並且與銀行進行合作進而承作類似儲蓄的預付儲值業務，讓使用者得以安心地進行網路交易，有效地推動電子商務的蓬勃發展[2]。」

本條例之原則主要有：鼓勵業務創新與發展、適度金融監理、維護市場秩序與公平競爭，同時注重他律與自律雙重並行。為了確保交易款項安全、保障消費者權益，於《電子支付機構管理條例》第20條第1項規定：「   

專營之電子支付機構對於儲值款項扣除應提列準備金之餘額，併同代理收付款項之金額，應全部交付信託或取得銀行十足之履約保證。」

其中，「交付信託」係指「與專用存款帳戶銀行簽訂信託契約，以專用存款帳戶為信託專戶。」，具體規範金管會制定有《專用存款管理辦法》。另外，尚設有清償基金機制，《電子支付機構管理條例》第38條第1項為避免電子支付機構未依第二十條交付信託或取得銀行十足履約保證，而

損及消費者權益，電子支付機構應提撥資金，設置清償基金，對此，金管會制定有《清償基金管理辦法》。

前篇提及 2014年發生之高雄氣爆事件可能依照國家賠償法第2條第2項請求賠償，

本文將接續探討國家賠償法第3條作為賠償請求基礎之可能性:

《國家賠償法》第3條規定：「

公有公共設施因設置或管理有欠缺，致人民生命、身體或財產受損害者，國家應負損害賠償責任。

前項情形，就損害原因有應負責任之人時，賠償義務機關對之有求償權。」

一開始爆炸案發生時，即有提出市區道路屬於高雄市政府之「公有公共設施」，故要求高雄市政府亦須負責，本案中，法院更具體指出該次氣爆之發生原因係因排水箱涵內之四吋管線施工有便宜行事情況，爆炸原因係因管線遭不當包覆於排水箱涵內，致管壁由外向內腐蝕並日漸減薄，而無法負荷輸送管內之壓力而破損，致運送中液態丙烯外洩，最後發生爆炸。

而此處排水箱涵屬於高雄市政府之「公有公共設施」，有《國家賠償法》第3條第1項之適用，故高雄市政府就此項公有公共設施設置之欠缺，須負擔國家賠償之責任。

一開始向高雄市政府求償之受災戶並不多[1]，而依《國家賠償法》第8條規定：「賠償請求權，自請求權人知有損害時起，因二年間不行使而消滅；自損害發生時起，逾五年者亦同。

第二條第三項、第三條第二項及第四條第二項之求償權，自支付賠償金或回復原狀之日起，因二年間不行使而消滅。」消滅時效為兩年，然高雄氣爆發生為2014年8月1日(從7月31日深夜起)，其他受災戶因為時效關係，而無法再向高雄市政府提起國家賠償之訴求償。

2014年發生高雄氣爆事件，迄今已逾2年，對於高雄市政府是否對於此事應向氣爆受災戶做出賠償? 若高雄市政府本身對於受災戶有賠償之責，又是否得代位求償[1]? 高雄市政府於氣爆後不久，即開始受理代位求償，這是我國第一次重大災害由市府代位求償的行為，然有一些受災戶認為氣爆事件政府亦應負起相關責任，因而提起國家賠償訴訟，高雄地院於今年8月31日宣判，認為高雄市政府對於氣爆事件也應負相關責任，判決賠償，本文將嘗試分析探討《國家賠償法》第2條、第3條之內容於本案適用之狀況。

首先應先說明國家賠償責任與損失補償並不相同，雖然人民皆因國家公權力之行使而受有損害，然賠償係肇因於國家「違法」侵害人民之權利，而損失補償則是因為國家「合法」行使公權力，但卻使人民受有損害時，為填補特定損害而給予之補償。國家賠償法係根據憲法第24條而制定，當國家「違法」侵害人民之權利時，人民得以據此向國家請求賠償。

《國家賠償法》第2條規定：「

本法所稱公務員者，謂依法令從事於公務之人員。

公務員於執行職務行使公權力時，因故意或過失不法侵害人民自由或權利者，國家應負損害賠償責任。公務員怠於執行職務，致人民自由或權利遭受損害者亦同。

前項情形，公務員有故意或重大過失時，賠償義務機關對之有求償權。」

第2條第2項前段是公務員之積極行為，後段則是消極行為，依司法院大法管解釋第469號：「國家賠償法第二條第二項後段所謂公務員怠於執行職務，係指公務員對於被害人有應執行之職務而怠於執行者而言。換言之，被害人對於公務員為特定職務行為，有公法上請求權存在，經請求其執行而怠於執行，致自由或權利遭受損害者，始得依上開規定，請求國家負損害賠償責任。若公務員對於職務之執行，雖可使一般人民享有反射利益，人民對於公務員仍不得請求為該職務之行為者，縱公務員怠於執行該職務，人民尚無公法上請求權可資行使，以資保護其利益，自不得依上開規定請求國家賠償損害。」

近年來，勞基法有多次修正，立法院於104年11月27日三讀通過「最低服務年限約款」，對於有特定技術、投入大量成本培訓員工之企業（例如：機師，航空公司通常需支出龐大費用來培訓未來員工），與勞工簽訂相關條款時，能有法律規範之依據，兼顧勞工權益以及企業利益，達勞資雙方雙贏之結果。

新增勞動基準法第15條之1，該條規定：「未符合下列規定之一，雇主不得與勞工為最低服務年限之約定：

一、雇主為勞工進行專業技術培訓，並提供該項培訓費用者。

二、雇主為使勞工遵守最低服務年限之約定，提供其合理補償者。

前項最低服務年限之約定，應就下列事項綜合考量，不得逾合理範圍：

一、雇主為勞工進行專業技術培訓之期間及成本。

二、從事相同或類似職務之勞工，其人力替補可能性。

三、雇主提供勞工補償之額度及範圍。

四、其他影響最低服務年限合理性之事項。

The purpose of this article is to analyze the circumstances of the case of Macquarie Generation v Hodgson[1] on behalf of Ms Hodgson and seek a remedy under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1987 (NSW) (‘POEO Act’). This is a case of whether there is a duty of care to take reasonable care to reduce the level of emissions which is harmful to the environment. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has held that there is no implied condition in Macquarie Generation’s (‘MG’) environment protection licence issued under the POEO Act to limit the total amount of CO₂ to be emitted into the atmosphere.

MG is and was a state owned corporation constituted by s4 of the Energy Service Corporation Act 1995 (NSW) (‘ESC Act’)[2] and is able to sue or be sued in its corporate name. At all material times, MG carried on the business of the wholesale generation of electricity in particular from a coal-fired power station known as the Bayswater Power Station situated at New England Highway, Muswellbrook, NSW (‘Bayswater Power Station’).

The latest judgment overturns Pain J’s decision in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (‘Environment Court’) where her Honour held that the applicant could bring a claim against MG’s licence to burn coal which was subject to an implied condition which limited its emission of CO₂ and to restrain MG from emitting an amount of CO₂ which harmed or was likely to harm the environment in contravention of section 115(1) of the POEO Act.[3] 

Nature of the proceedings

Gray No 1- the respondent’s motion for dismissal of proceedings[4]

The applicants bought civil enforcement proceedings pursuant to s252 of the POEO Act[5] in Gray No 1,[6] seeking a declaration that the Respondent willfully or negligently disposed of waste by the emission of CO₂ into the atmosphere in a manner which harmed or was likely to harm the environment contrary to s115 (1) of the POEO Act.[7]

Applying this case to the current factual scenario, if MG had lawful authority to emit CO₂ which is denied, it could be argued that the limits of that authority are to be implied from the Environment Protection Licence. Further or in alternative, even if MG has lawful authority to emit CO₂ at the Bayswater Power Station, it is only authorised to emit CO₂ in a manner that has reasonable regard and care for the interests of other persons and/or the environment.[8]

Gray No 2-Macquarie Generation’s application for costs[9]

In Gray No 2, the court held that the litigation was brought in the public interest and it was appropriate in the circumstances that each party pay its own costs. The court dismissed the application.[10]

Gray No 3- the Applicants’ motion for leave to rely on a further amended summons and points of claim[11]

The appeal-Macquarie Generation[1]

MG appealed against Pain J’s interlocutory finding. In respect to the determination the existence of any implied conditions, Handley AJA (with whom Whealy JA and Meagher JA agreed) rejected with the notion that limits on statutory immunity from liability in tort can apply to proceedings under a statute which does not invoke common law rights.[2] It was argued that an implied condition could only exist if it was necessary, obvious, clear and consistent with the express terms of the licence.[3] While private rights generally focus on common law protection, the tort of public nuisance protects public right and can be brought in respect of public environmental harm.[4] By applying the test, the court found it unnecessary to imply the condition sought to make the licence effective and noted that the condition relied upon by the climate change action group would in fact tend to contradict the licence.[5] Instead, the Court found it necessary to imply a term that permitted MG to emit CO₂ for the reason that “a licence to burn coal would otherwise be ineffective”.[6]

Arguments relied in Court

The court held a five-fold test to determine whether a term of a contract should be implied. In determining the existence of any implied conditions, the Court held that the relevant test for the implication of conditions under contract law is to be reasonable and equitable, be necessary and obvious that it goes without saying, and be clear and not to contradict any express term of the contract. The Court of Appeal held that in this case, the implied condition does not apply, as it would actually contradict the licence issued to MG since the licence was one entitling it to burn coal. The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicants’ argument that the POEO Act automatically incorporated an Environmental Impact Statement (‘EIS’) for a project into the licence. It was held that the extent of the Environmental Protection Authority (‘EPA’) duty was to take the EIS into account and it is for the EPA to incorporate the EIS into the licence, not the court.

Further, Pain J refrained from the argument that CO₂ emitted by MG was a “waste” under section 115(1) of the POEO Act.[7] From 1 January 2002 to 26 July 2009, the emission of CO₂ from the Bayswater Power Station have dispersed and accumulated in the atmosphere. This has resulted the increased of the atmospheric concentration of anthropogenic CO₂ atmosphere and altered the environment.

In Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency,[8] it was held by the United States Supreme Court that the US Environmental Protection Agency had authority to regulate CO₂ and other greenhouse gases under the Clear Air Act because they fell within the definition of an ‘air pollutant’ under that legislation. While the Land and Environment Court[9] itself recognised the importance of the case as building on the principles of the case of Massachusetts,[10] Pain J did not however finalise his decision in Gray No 3[11] of whether or not CO₂ was a ‘waste’ for the purpose of the POEO Act.[12] One of the arguments was that MG did not have lawful authority under s115 of the POEO Act[13] concerning the disposal of ‘waste’ for emissions in an excessive level imposed by the implied EPL condition. However the Court’s rejection of the implied condition in the EPL that limits the overall consumption of CO₂ by MG rendered it unnecessary to determine whether or not CO₂ was a ‘waste’ under the Act.

Ms. Hodgson’s argument

While Hodgson put forward a logical argument, it was not as well formulated as it could have been. The applicants’ argument was based on analogy with the common law principle that while statutory authorisation will provide immunity from an action in nuisance, it will not do so if the authorised act is carried out negligently.[14] The applicants chose to argue that by virtue of the construction of s115 of POEO Act[15] MG was required to take care of its CO₂ emissions, either as an implied limitation under s115[16] or as an implied condition under its licence. Relying on this argument is problematic as proof of the offence under s115(1)[17] by applicant would require proof of the negligent disposal of waste and also proof by the respondent under s115(2) that the activity carried out by the respondent was not negligent. Furthermore, such interpretation by Hodgson J need not be done this way when the applicant implied that one of the condition of the environment protection licence was to take reasonable care to reduce emission.[18] For instance, s115(1)[19] should have been presented as establishing the primary duty not to dispose of waste negligently and s115(2)[20] should be interpreted to require the defendant to establish lawful authority to the extent of whether there was negligent to cause environment harm. Because of this, the court overlooked the analogy that could have been drawn between s115(1) and public nuisance environmental harm with the possibility of restraint the use of s115(2) defence. It is argued that the court was too quick to dismiss the applicants’ case for which s115 could have been reasonably argued by establishing an ongoing duty for corporations holding such licence to take reasonable care to reduce emissions harmful to the environment and to see whether MG has done everything reasonably possible to reduce its CO₂ emissions and whether such character of environmental harm would be attributed to its emissions.[21]

Private vs. Public right (Civil Enforcement)

In the case of Gray[1] the applicants were two members of a climate change activist group and as private citizens brought proceedings pursuant to an open standing provision to enforce pollution laws so as to require mitigation of MG’s total emissions. While private rights generally focus on common law protection, the tort of public nuisance protects public rights and can be brought in respect of public environmental harm. At common law, the attorney general can bring actions in public nuisance where such act or omission endanger the life, health, property, morals or comfort of the public or obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of their rights. Because the court has failed to apply analogous cases between public nuisance and environmental harm by operation of s115(1) of the POEO Act,[2] with respect, such point ought to be properly addressed in by the next court of appeal hearing/judgment.

It is argued that MG, during the relevant period, has indirectly altered the environment by increasing the atmospheric concentration of anthropogenic CO_2. This has contributed to global warming and ocean acidification in a manner that has harmed the environment within the meaning of s115 of the POEO Act[3] which has resulted “pollution” within the meaning of the Act. Such air pollution defined under the POEO Act[4] means that any air impurity which include smoke, dust, cinders, solid particles of any kind, gases, fumes, mists, odours and radioactive substances which has harmed the environment directly or indirectly has altered the environment in the effect of degrading the environment.

Statutory interpretation

The purpose of the POEO Act[5] is to assist in the management of the environment. In December 1996, the Protection of the Environment Operations Bill[6] was introduced with the aim of strengthening the State’s regulatory framework from pollution control to protecting the environment and to reduce pollution, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of environment protection legislation and to assist the achievement of the objectives set forth in the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995 (NSW)[7] which is consistent with the objectives of the EPA under the POEO.[8] The POEO Act[9] now replaced the pollution control legislation for which objectives has broadened by using variety of tools to protect, restore and enhance the environment to reduce pollution. Such objectives in these various pieces of legislation translate into the EPA’s corporate goals, which are to improve the state of the environment in NSW to support an environmental friendly community and to continue to improve the EPA’s organizational performance. Matters to be taken into consideration in licensing functions are that the EPA is required to consider all relevant effects of granting a licence to bodies that may pollute. CO₂ is a greenhouse gas that is not environmental friendly especially when it is produced in excess. Despite the fact that MG had a licence to emit pollution which didn’t cover CO_2, yet such a requirement clearly fit as a consideration that should be considered by the EPA. In assessing such a licence, the appropriate regulatory authority ought to consider its environmental policy,[10] the EPA’s objectives[11] or guidelines issued by the EPA.[12] Consider whether such activity or work is likely to cause environmental harm[13] by taking practical measures to prevent or to mitigate the pollution so as to protect the environment from environmental harm[14] or to restore the environmental value.[15] In addition, the EPA must consider whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold such the licence.[16] Such applicants may be granted licences either unconditionally or subject to conditions such as to limit on the types and quantities of pollution or monitor with reporting requirements so as to prevent any likely environmental harm.[17]

Despite part 3.5 of the POEO Act[18] provides a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be attached to a licence. However if such licence condition is challenged in court, any condition imposed must reasonably relate to the subject of the licence. If such licence condition imposed by the EPA is irrelevant to the purpose of the licence grant, that is the pollution control, or if such licence condition is unclear in its application or is unreasonable according to the Wednesbury[19] principles, a court or tribunal may strike down such condition/s.[20] It is an offence for a licence holder to supply information to the EPA if it is false or misleading.[21] Conditions may also require MG, as a licence holder to provide information in relation to the pollution incident of a type for which to notify the EPA in accordance with part 5.7 of the POEO Act.[22] In addition, s117 of the POEO Act[23] provides that the emission of ozone depleting substances in a manner that harms the environment would constitute as the most serious offence.[24] For such operation of premises in such a manner to cause air pollution is guilty of an offence,[25] provided such air pollution was caused from premises within the meaning of sections [124]-[126] of the POEO Act,[26] unless MG satisfies the court that such air pollution did not cause air pollution outside the premises.[27]

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal's decision provides some certainty to all holders of pollution licences that conditions and limitations on such licences won't be arbitrarily implied. Whether CO₂ may be found to constitute a "waste" for the purposes of section 115(1) of the POEO Act[28] in future remains a live question.

Bibliographies