眾律國際法律事務所

                 百尺竿頭數位娛樂有限公司(下稱百尺公司)公開收購樂陞科技股份有限公司(下稱樂陞公司)股權案破局，股民組成「樂陞收購自救會」，並要求該收購案受委任機構即中國信託銀行(信託部)及中國信託證券(承銷部)，於受託買賣有價證券前，未妥適評估客戶投資能力，應併負責任。金管會表示本公開收購案於條件成就後卻惡意違約不履行交割，嚴重破壞資本市場正常秩序，中國信託證券及中國信託銀行身為專業金融機構，尤應注意落實執行相關規定，以關注投資人權益之保障並對上開機構作出行政處分如下：

1. 中國信託證券：擔任本公開收購案之財務顧問，有未善盡證券商應有之專業職責及注意，未嚴謹評估所提供財務顧問服務之對象，未確實確認服務對象之身分、其實質受益人為何及該等受益人與相關人等之關係，核有未落實內部控制制度有效執行之情事，違反證券商管理規則第2條第2項及金管會103年9月24日金管證券字第10300348301號令所定證券商辦理財顧業務應依其內部控制制度為之，爰依證券交易法第66條第3款規定，對中國信託證券處以停止財務規劃及諮詢顧問業務3個月之處分，並至缺失完成改善為止。
2. 中國信託銀行：中國信託銀行於依公開收購公開發行公司有價證券管理辦法第15條規定辦理客戶百尺公司公開收購樂陞公司普通股案之股務代理契約，在評估該客戶風險方面，未審慎評估及探究客戶之實際收益人狀況，客戶審查評估表亦未嚴謹確認實際受益人狀況，有未符合該銀行「認識客戶政策」程序，前揭缺失顯示其內部控制制度未能有效執行，另中國信託銀行未依信託業法第42條第2項，訂定辦理公開收購公開發行公司有價證券管理辦法第15條規定之內部控制作業程序，致未能考量應賣人權益保障，核有缺失。爰依信託業法第57條規定，處中國信託銀行新臺幣300萬元罰鍰，並依同法第44條第2款規定，對該銀行辦理公開收購相關之信託業務予以停止3個月之處分，並至缺失完成改善為止。

                釋字726號聲請人受雇於保全公司擔任現金運送保全員，雙方曾簽訂僱用合約書約定：勞方每日正常工作時間為12小時且每月工作超過約定時數時，雇主始按固定數額給付加班費，即雇主以各別僱用契約排除排除勞動基準法(下稱本法)第30條、第32條及第24條規定之適用是否適法？

       按本法第84條之1規定(下稱系爭規定)，經中央主管機關核定公告之特定工作，得由勞雇雙方另行約定工作時間、例假、休假、女性夜間工作，並報請當地主管機關核備，不受第30條（工作時間）、第32條（延長工作時間）、第36條（例假日）、第37條（休假日，即應放假日）、第49條（女性夜間工作）等規定之限制，且應以書面為之，不得損及勞工健康及福祉。系爭規定係為因應部分性質特殊工作之需要，在法定條件下，給予雇主與特定勞工合理協商工作時間等之彈性。

       本件經最高法院判決，認為勞雇雙方有關每日正常工作時間、每月基本服勤時數、加班時數即加班費率計算方式之約定，依系爭規定，並非無效，不因為報請當地主管機關核備，有違行政管理規定，而有不同(最高法院102年度台上字第1866號民事判決理由參照)。惟釋字第726號解釋則認為，「並報請當地主管機關核備」雖屬行政管理之程序規定，然因工時之延長影響勞工之健康及福祉甚鉅，且因相同性質之工作，在不同地區，仍可能存在實質重大之差異，而有由當地主管機關審慎逐案核實之必要。且其管制之內容又非僅單純要求提供勞雇雙方約定之內容備查，自應認其規定有直接干預勞動關係之民事效力。故系爭規定中「並報請當地主管機關核備」之要件，應為民法第71條所稱之強制規定[1]，如未經當地主管機關核備，該約定尚不得排除前揭規定之限制，除可發生公法上不利於雇主之效果外，如就工作時間等事項另行約定而未經核備者，可依上開第30條等規定予以調整，並依同法第24條、第39條規定計付工資。

       另依本法第84條之1以及其施行細則第50條之1規定，僅監督管理人員、責任制專業人員、從事一定場所之監視性工作、間歇性工作及其他性質特殊之工作等實施「責任制」，勞動部並於104年起排除14類[2]原適用勞基法第84條之1規定之責任制工作者。未經政府核可逕自實施責任制，主管機關除得處罰鍰外，且得限期改善，屆期未改善者，應按次處罰。併予敘明。

「所得稅法」第43條之3、第43條之4、第126條修正案業經通過，所建立之受控外國企業（Controlled Foreign Company，CFC）及實際管理處所（Place of Effective Management，PEM）制度，係為防杜營利事業藉於低稅負地區設立CFC並保留盈餘不分配或以設立境外公司，轉換居住者身分等手段，規避應申報繳納之我國營利事業所得稅等脫法行為，以維持租稅正義。其制度重點如下：
一、CFC制度
（一）所得稅法第43條之3明定營利事業及其關係人直接或間接持有設立於低稅負國家（地區）關係企業股份或資本額合計達50％以上，或對該關係企業具有重大影響力者，該營利事業股東應就該關係企業當年度盈餘，按持股比率及持有期間計算，認列投資收益課稅。倘CFC於當地有從事實質營運活動或當年度盈餘低於一定標準者，排除適用。
（二）為詳實計算CFC可供分配盈餘，明定CFC各期虧損得於10年內自其盈餘中扣除；已依CFC制度認列收入課稅之投資收益，於實際獲配時不再計入課稅，及提供國外稅額扣抵機制，以避免重複課稅。
二、PEM制度
（一）所得稅法第43條之4明定依外國法律設立之境外公司，其PEM在我國境內者，應視為總機構在我國境內之營利事業，依所得稅法及其他相關法律規定課徵營利事業所得稅及辦理扣繳與填發憑單相關作業。其認定要件如下：
1、作成重大經營管理、財務管理及人事管理決策者為我國境內居住之個人或總機構在我國境內之營利事業，或作成該等決策之處所在我國境內。
2、財務報表、會計帳簿紀錄、董事會議事錄或股東會議事錄之製作或儲存處所在我國境內。
3、在我國境內有實際執行主要經營活動。

金管會修正「銀行國際金融業務分行辦理衍生性金融商品業務規範」，主要係配合「銀行業辦理外匯業務管理辦法」第12條，修訂第2點對申請程序，即針對專業機構投資人及高淨值投資法人以外之客戶，提供尚未開放或開放未滿半年之複雜性高風險商品，改採開辦前申請核准程序。上揭規範修正如下：

OBU(銀行國際金融業務分行)辦理衍生性金融商品業務，除下列事項外，應依「銀行辦理衍生性金融商品業務內部作業制度及程序管理辦法」（下稱管理辦法）辦理，並應確實遵循中華民國銀行商業同業公會全國聯合會訂定之自律規範中OBU適用之規定：                                                                                                                 

一、OBU辦理衍生性金融商品業務，除經主管機關核准者外，以未涉及新臺幣者為限；交易對象以中華民國境外客戶及「國際金融業務條例」第四條第二項所稱之中華民國境內金融機構為限。

二、申請程序

(一) OBU經核准辦理衍生性金融商品業務後，對於個別衍生性金融商品之，除涉及本辦法第7條第1項第1款、第2款及本點第2款之商品外，無須再逐案申請核准。

(二) OBU向屬本辦法第3條第1項第1款及第2款所稱專業機構投資人及高淨值投資法人以外之客戶，提供尚未開放或開放未滿半年之複雜性高風險商品，應檢送本辦法第8條規定書件，向本會申請核准，並副知中央銀行。本會於核准第一家銀行辦理且開放已滿半年後，其他銀行應於開辦首筆交易後7日內檢附書件報本會備查及副知中央銀行，並應俟收到本會同意備查函後，始得繼續辦理次筆交易。

(三) OBU辦理本辦法第7條第1項第1款、第2款及前款以外商品，應於開辦後15日內檢附商品特性說明書、法規遵循聲明書及風險預告書等文件報本會備查，並副知中央銀行。

(四) OBU擬辦理總行（或外國銀行申請認許時所設分行）業經主管機關核准或備查之外幣衍生性金融商品，得免前述函報主管機關備查之程序。

三、OBU辦理外幣信用違約交換（Credit Default Swap）及外幣信用違約選擇權（Credit Default Option）業務，應依下列規定辦理：

(一) 交易對象以「境外結構型商品管理規則」第3條第3項第1款所稱之境外專業機構投資人、「國際金融業務條例」第4條第2項所稱之中華民國境內金融機構，及最近一期財務報告總資產超過等值新臺幣五千萬元，且資本額超過等值新臺幣一千萬元之境外法人為限。

針對立委黃國昌在立院質詢指出，國內有銀行提供「TRF（目標可贖回遠期契約）一條龍」服務，如主動建議設立境外公司藉以購買TRF、製作不實財報等，金管會為調查相關事實於本(105)年4、5月間，對國銀OBU（國際金融業務分行）全面展開專案金檢，並於9月12日進行相關懲處。金管會並表示，銀行須限期檢討企金部門負責人、相關人員疏失責任和適任性並進行課程訓練，並檢視銷售人員的獎酬薪制之妥適性。除處以罰鍰外，並限制對非專業投資人新承作隱含賣出外匯選擇權衍生性金融商品業務(含結構型商品業務)，對其OBU獲利將有重大影響。

惟此次處罰理由係以銀行未妥適建立或未確實執行具專業投資人身分之OBU客戶資力及其專業資格檢核之OBU開戶管控程序、行員協助編製客戶財務資料復進行後續審核，相關內部控制未發揮功能以及未妥善保管交易糾紛客戶之交易與聯繫紀錄資料等理由，以銀行違反銀行法銀行法第45條之1[1]第1項、第61條之1[2]、第129條第7款進行裁處，並僅以行政指導方式，命銀行檢討相關人員及制度設計之妥適性並要求銀行追回業務人員不當銷售所發給之業務獎金，而未直接針對OBU推介程序或新獎制度直接予以規範限制，或銀行銷售TRF之妥適性進行說明，仍有迴避之疑。

銀行應建立內部控制及稽核制度；其目的、原則、政策、作業程序、內部稽核人員應具備之資格條件、委託會計師辦理內部控制查核之範圍及其他應遵行事項之辦法，由主管機關定之。

銀行對資產品質之評估、損失準備之提列、逾期放款催收款之清理及呆帳之轉銷，應建立內部處理制度及程序；其辦法，由主管機關定之。

銀行作業委託他人處理者，其對委託事項範圍、客戶權益保障、風險管理及內部控制原則，應訂定內部作業制度及程序；其辦法，由主管機關定之。

銀行辦理衍生性金融商品業務，其對該業務範圍、人員管理、客戶權益保障及風險管理，應訂定內部作業制度及程序；其辦法，由主管機關定之。

銀行違反法令、章程或有礙健全經營之虞時，主管機關除得予以糾正、命其限期改善外，並得視情節之輕重，為下列處分︰

一、撤銷法定會議之決議。

二、停止銀行部分業務。

三、命令銀行解除經理人或職員之職務。

四、解除董事、監察人職務或停止其於一定期間內執行職務。

五、其他必要之處置。

依前項第四款解除董事、監察人職務時，由主管機關通知經濟部撤銷其董事、監察人登記。

為改善銀行之營運缺失而有業務輔導之必要時，主管機關得指定機構辦理之。

為保護投資人，參考「信託業營運範圍受益權轉讓限制風險揭露及行銷訂約管理辦法」第27條規定，增訂「中華民國證券商業同業公會證券商受託買賣外國有價證券管理辦法」第31條第4項，證券商於辦理受託買賣外國有價證券業務時，應於交易前向委託人(及投資人)揭露相關費用與其收取方式。增訂條文於本(105 )年 9月 7日公告，並自即日起施行。前揭條文修正如下：

證券商辦理受託買賣外國有價證券業務，得收取手續費及其他費用。手續費包含證券商受託買賣手續費及代收代付予複受託金融機構之手續費、外國證券交易市場之稅捐及規費、保管機構保管費與其他相關費用。證券商受託買賣外國有價證券之手續費，得參酌外國當地證券市場受託買賣外國有價證券之手續費計收。其他費用之費率，由各受託買賣外國有價證券之證券商自行研訂。

證券商應詳細列明手續費及其他費用所包括之項目，送本公會彙報主管機關備查。

證券商辦理受託買賣外國有價證券業務，應於交易前向委託人揭露前項相關費用與其收取方式。

證券商辦理受託買賣外國有價證券業務，自交易相對人取得之報酬、費用、折讓等各項利益，應明定收取費率之範圍。

證券商應於收取前項利益後，將實際收取之費率（有價證券有年限者應包含年化費率）告知委託人；以非專業投資人為對象而受託買賣之有價證券，前項收取費率範圍依有價證券年限，每年不得超過受理買賣該有價證券總金額之百分之零點五，未滿一年部分按比率計算之。但證券投資信託基金管理辦法、證券投資信託事業募集證券投資信託基金處理準則、境外基金管理辦法或境外結構型商品管理規則另有規定者，從其規定。

第一商業銀行自動櫃員機（ATM）遭異常提領所涉缺失事項，金管會認其違反銀行法第45條之1第1項規定，並依同法第129條第7款規定，核處新臺幣1,000萬元罰鍰；另案關缺失有礙貴行健全經營之虞，併依銀行法第61條之1第1項第2款規定，在缺失原因未查明及改善完成前，暫停其ATM無卡提款業務。裁處理由如下(金管會中華民國105年9月12日金管銀控字第10560003721號函參照)：

1. 辦理分行ATM及錄影監視系統之維修保養作業，於機器故障或異常使用時，有漏未將相關原因及處理情形予以登記，且有未查明維修工程師身分、未在場監督或未全程陪同及未留存維修工作單之情形；另分行ATM之錄影監視有錄影監視畫面不連續、無影像且與相關紀錄不符之情形。違反「金融機構安全維護管理辦法」第5條第6款、「金融機構自動櫃員機安全防護準則」、及「第一商業銀行自動櫃員機安全防護作業要點」等規定。
2. 未依「金融機構安全維護管理辦法」第6條第3款第5目規定，確實指派專人負責監控系統狀態，且未建立非正常程序提領鈔券(如直接驅動鈔匣吐鈔)、現鈔與帳務盤點不符或其他緊急狀況等異常行為之即時監控機制與自動化提醒警示作業，以致於ATM監控系統已記錄到「鈔券已用罄」及「結存尚有多張鈔券」同時並存之不合理情形時，貴行未能立即因應處理。
3. 未將ATM管理伺服器以獨立網段區隔，且未對倫敦分行之電話錄音系統先採行妥適之資安防護措施，即將其加入內部網路，導致駭客得以上開電話錄音系統為入侵平台滲入貴行ATM設備。違反「金融機構辦理電子銀行業務安全控管作業基準」第11條第2款規定。
4. 查核發現有使用者帳號於非營業時間登入ATM監控系統伺服器之情形，惟未能透過日常檢核作業即時發現異常登入；另駭客係滲入貴行內部網路偽冒派送ATM軟體更新作業，將惡意程式植入ATM設備，惟查貴行未指派專人透過應用系統或作業系統，檢視是否有未經核准之派版作業執行紀錄，相關軟體派送之監控作業尚待強化。

                實務上，我國交通事故責任判定採優先路權概念，概念就是車道是給車子走的，行人必須走人行道、地下道或天橋，不能任意行走於車道上；汽、機車亦要依道路標示分道而行。汽車、機車或行人若行於非自己的道路上，即觸犯到他車或他人路權，一旦發生事故，違者必須負擔絕大責任。
 

                汽機車行駛至交岔路口的優先路權判定有幾個基本原則，如直行車先行(道路交通安全規則第102條第1項第7款規定)；幹、支道交叉的路口，幹道有優先路權，支道車要讓幹道車先行；同一方向之少線道車輛要禮讓多線道車輛；同為直行車或轉彎車時，左方車必須讓右方車先行；外環車要讓內環車先行等……。

                惟『路權』並非絕對不可侵犯之權利，是除有關路權之各項具體規範外，尚有明定駕駛人必須遵守注意車前狀況或兩車併行距離等相關概括規定之必要，且所謂車前狀況亦非僅以駕駛人所遵行之車道為限，尚須擴及視線所及之可能範圍，藉此賦予駕駛人在享有路權之同時，仍應確實注意周遭突發情事與他人行車狀況之義務，促使各類用路人均能妥適採取避免或降低交通往來風險之舉措，否則倘如本件雖因被告駕車違規右轉，若謂原告逕可不問兩車相距為何或是否確實注意他人行車狀況，徒憑其是時享有路權而率行主張卸免一切責任，實與上述交通安全規則之法律本意有悖（高雄地方法院99年重訴字第274號判決參照）。

              是以，車主並非因為有優先路權，就可以免除所有事故責任，仍須遵守交通法規。例如轉彎車雖有未禮讓讓直行車先行之過失，惟直型車在一般行車狀況下，應可提前注意前開車輛右轉之事實，詎其猶疏未注意，亦堪推認就系爭事故實有未併予注意車前狀況之與有過失。

                釋字第728號解釋理由略以，祭祀公業係由設立人捐助財產，以祭祀祖先或其他享祀人為目的之團體。其設立及存續，涉及設立人及其子孫之結社自由、財產權與契約自由。按祭祀公業條例第4條第1項前段規定：「本條例施行前已存在之祭祀公業，其派下員依規約定之。」實質上規約依循傳統之宗族觀念僅以男系子孫（含養子）為派下員，形成差別待遇，惟系爭規定形式上既未以性別作為認定派下員之標準，且其目的在於維護法秩序之安定及法律不溯及既往之原則，況相關規約係設立人及其子孫所為之私法上結社及財產處分行為，基於憲法第14條保障結社自由、第15條保障財產權及第22條保障契約自由及私法自治，原則上應予以尊重。是系爭規定實質上縱形成差別待遇，惟並非恣意，尚難認與憲法第7條保障性別平等之意旨有違，致侵害女子之財產權。

                惟實質上的差別待遇（substantive discrimination）就不是差別待遇？從性別歧視與文化傳統兩者關係而言，絕大多數的文化傳統，都存在對於生理性別形成差別待遇，進一步內化成為一種社會性別而存在於社會規範與制度之中，本件解釋多數意見，以該規範無形式上差別待遇（formal discrimination）即認係合憲之理由，尊重的不僅是「私法自治」還尊重了對於祭祀公業規約所隱含性別歧視之傳統習慣，堅持「尊重私法自治與法安定性」優於性別平等，但若只是重視形式及習慣，我們又為何需要大法官解釋？又祭祀公業既然是設立人捐助財產所生之團體，其團體成員以具有「祭祀祖先或其他享祀人」之目的，是其身分應予該目的具有一定關聯。實際上祭祀公業之財產，係多以「土地」為主，並由其使用收益作為派下員祭祀祖先或其他享祀人之用。因此，對於派下員之權利，應同時具有身分權及因身分權所附隨之財產權，本件大法官僅認聲請人之財產權並未因違反平等原則而受到侵害，亦有疑義。

                本文贊同黃茂榮大法官於不同意見書之論點，就祭祀公業條例施行前已存在之祭祀公業，雖不宜恣意變動先前既存之狀態，然就男女平權思潮高漲、祭祀功能式微之今日，非不得以情勢變更作為調整規約之正當理由，並對日後派下權之再繼承之法律關係予以界定。即建議，在最近一層派下權人死亡時，應採派下權人與其法定繼承人間之繼承關係，而不採設立人與其隔代子孫之繼承關係，來認定派下權之取得。如此，不僅有助於釐清各別派下員之派下權、活化祭祀公業財產之利用，並與民法繼承篇之規定相符。

                指數股票型基金（ETF）成交比重連年攀升，全球ETF規模也持續明顯增長，主要是著眼於ETF交易成本較現貨交易成本低、較傳統基金操作透明度高且進場門檻較低等優點，吸引大量散戶搶進。

                金融與外幣商品愈趨多元，為提供投資人多元化商品及不同幣別資產配置需求，證交所修正相關法規，開放投信可發行雙幣交易的ETF於集中市場買賣，即同一檔ETF在集中市場提供二種幣別買賣，各自有證券代號，分別進行撮合，交易時間、升降單位、交易單位等均比照新台幣ETF，雙幣ETF的產品優勢在於價格具一定的連動性，但在市場需求不同、匯率變動情況下，將產生價差，可提供市場套利交易。惟不得融資融券、借券、當沖，也不得進行證券商辦理證券業務借貸款項、不限用途款項借貸、交割款融資、擔保放款，也不得做為擔保品及權證標的，同時也不能在初級市場辦理申購及買回。目前僅開放人民幣，而首檔加掛人民幣之ETF已於本(105)年8月8日正式上市。

                由於買賣人民幣加掛ETF交割款及手續費均以人民幣計收，考量證交所初期規畫的雙幣型受益憑證交易之結算交割規範，交割時間為交易日後第2個營業日，因此財政部參照期交所現有的外幣計價商品，交易期貨交易稅計算繳納方式，計算繳納證交稅。原應納稅額係外幣，因此需結售換成新台幣來繳庫，證券自營商或證券交易稅代徵人，應在交割當日以外幣計算應納稅額(計算至小數點後2位)，按證交稅稅率千分之一計算，並以交割日或次一營業日實際結售換成新台幣繳證交稅。併依證券交易稅條例第3條第4項規定應送該管稽徵機關之交易資料，仍應以新臺幣表示，並保留結匯資料，以供查核(財政部105.05.26台財稅第10504524600號令參照)。

               「銀行業辦理外匯業務管理辦法」於92年7月23日訂定。茲為立法院財委會3月28日提案決議，要求加強監理，央行、金管會同步進行第8次修正，並自本(105)年9月11日起生效。本次主要修正內容如下：

• 修正條文第4條明訂，複雜性高風險外匯衍生性商品、專業客戶、專業機構投資人及高淨值投資法人準用「銀行辦理衍生性金融商品業務內部作業制度及程序管理辦法」第2條及第3條所規定之定義。                                                                        1.「複雜性高風險商品」，係指具有結算或比價期數超過三期且隱含賣出選擇權特性之衍生性金融商品，但不包括結構型商品、交換契約（Swap）、陽春型選擇權（Plain vanilla option）、遠期外匯或其他經主管機關核定之商品類型。                                                                                                                                       2.      「專業客戶」，係指法人與自然人符合以下條件之一者：

A.      專業機構投資人。

B.      高淨值投資法人：總資產超過新臺幣二百億元、設有投資專責單位並配置適任專業人員、持有有價證券部位或衍生性金融商品投資組合達新臺幣十億元以上並具有合適投資程序及風險管理措施之內控制度者。

C.      專業客戶之法人或基金：總資產超過新臺幣一億元。

D.      專業客戶之自然人：客戶充分了解銀行得免除之責任後同意簽署為專業客戶並提供新臺幣三千萬元以上之財力證明；或單筆交易金額逾新臺幣三百萬元，且於該銀行之存款及投資往來總資產逾新臺幣一千五百萬元，及提供總資產超過新臺幣三千萬元以上之財力聲明書者。

E.       委託人符合上揭規定之信託業者。

• 就指定銀行對專業機構投資人及高淨值投資法人以外之客戶辦理新種複雜性高風險外匯衍生性商品，其申辦程序皆改採開辦前申請許可制；放寬指定銀行對高淨值投資法人辦理尚未開放或開放未滿半年，且未涉及新臺幣匯率之外匯衍生性商品業務，得採開辦後函報備查方式；刪除指定銀行提供境外衍生性金融商品之資訊及諮詢服務業務得提供服務對象範圍之規定，以及納入放寬指定銀行得不經申請逕行辦理未涉及新臺幣匯率之外匯衍生性商品範圍之通函規範，俾利遵循。(修正條文第12條)
• 放寬指定銀行辦理外匯衍生性商品之在職訓練課程，得擴及一般衍生性商品，不限外匯相關者。(修正條文第14條)
• 修正有關信用衍生性商品承作對象之規範。（修正條文第32條）

                為應立法院105年3月28日臨時提案：「為確保金融市場之穩健發展、維護投資人權益，爰要求爾後複雜性高風險之衍生性金融商品應經主管機關審核通過後，始得發行銷售，但交易對象為專業機構投資人、高淨值投資法人，不在此限。」。 金管會遂於105年5月5日邀集相關機關團體共同研商複雜性高風險衍生性金融商品審查與申請程序，修正「銀行辦理衍生性金融商品業務內部作業制度及程序管理辦法」第7條及第8條，並於105年9月11日開始實施。

修正重點說明如下：

1. 按第7條第1項前段規定，銀行已取得辦理衍生性金融商品業務之核准者（其中屬辦理期貨商業務者，並應依期貨交易法之規定取得許可），得開辦各種衍生性金融商品及其商品之組合，並於開辦後15日內檢附商品特性說明書、法規遵循聲明書及風險預告書報金管會備查。原則上，除新種臺股股權衍生性金融商品、外匯衍生性金融商品及除臺股股權衍生性金融商品外之其他涉及從事衍生自國內股價及期貨交易所有關之現貨商品及指數等契約外，銀行辦理衍生性金融商品業務均採事後函報備查。
2. 現增訂第7條第1項第3款，銀行向專業機構投資人及高淨值投資法人以外客戶提供複雜性高風險商品，應向主管機關申請核准或函報備查程序，其中未涉及外匯之商品，銀行應向金管會申請；涉及外匯之商品，銀行應向中央銀行申請並副知金管會。針對尚未開放或開放未滿半年之新種商品，採開辦前申請核准程序，開放已滿半年者，採開辦後函報備查程序（修正條文第7條第4、5項參照）。
3. 修正條文第八條增訂，銀行向本會申請辦理衍生性金融商品應檢具之文件得包括常務董(理)事會決議錄。

日商「百尺竿頭數位娛樂股份有限公司」(下稱百尺公司)，今（2016）年5月底宣布以每股128元(溢價幅度達21.9%)，公開收購3800萬股樂陞科技股份有限公司(下稱樂陞公司)普通股股票，亦表示此次公開收購係以財務投資人的角度，增加對樂陞公司持股，與經營權無涉。惟本件公開收購之條件成就後，公開收購人百尺公司卻以在公開收購過程中，市場上的眾多謠言及投機者大量拋售股票造成股價波動與大幅下跌，致百尺公司發生資金調度困難，決議不完成本次公開收購之交割，因而退還交存之樂陞公司股份予應賣人，此一公開收購流程致樂陞公司市值蒸發40% (樂陞公司股價表現如下表)，亦成為第一宗公開收購違約交割案。

                                                                                                                                                       資料來源：鉅亨網

       由於百尺公司係2014年9月登記成立的僑外資公司，資本額僅5千萬元，其於收購案的最後一天，始表示無力繳款而致樂陞公司股票重挫，又應賣人已經繳交股票無法交易，只能被迫承擔該跌價損失。

應賣投資人得依與百尺公司成立之收購契約，擇一主張向法院提起民事訴訟如下，(請求權時效為15年)：

1. 解除系爭公開收購契約，並向百尺公司請求相關損害賠償：投資人得自行將催告暨解除契約函送達至百尺公司，並於所定催告期限到期、原公開收購契約解除後，自行向百尺公司所在地法院提起訴訟，請求依民法第 260 條等規定負原契約履行利益之損害賠償責任。
2. 不解除契約，而訴請百尺竿頭給付每股新台幣 128 元之收購價款： 惟此一請求仍須視法院是否認可，且百尺公司仍可能拒絕履約或提出同時履行抗辯。

      為避免海外求償不易，投資人除得自行向法院提起訴訟外，亦得授與訴訟實施權予財團法人證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心(下稱投保中心)提起團體訴訟，辦理後續求償事宜。

The purpose of this article is to analyze the circumstances of the case of Macquarie Generation v Hodgson[1] on behalf of Ms Hodgson and seek a remedy under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1987 (NSW) (‘POEO Act’). This is a case of whether there is a duty of care to take reasonable care to reduce the level of emissions which is harmful to the environment. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has held that there is no implied condition in Macquarie Generation’s (‘MG’) environment protection licence issued under the POEO Act to limit the total amount of CO₂ to be emitted into the atmosphere.

MG is and was a state owned corporation constituted by s4 of the Energy Service Corporation Act 1995 (NSW) (‘ESC Act’)[2] and is able to sue or be sued in its corporate name. At all material times, MG carried on the business of the wholesale generation of electricity in particular from a coal-fired power station known as the Bayswater Power Station situated at New England Highway, Muswellbrook, NSW (‘Bayswater Power Station’).

The latest judgment overturns Pain J’s decision in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (‘Environment Court’) where her Honour held that the applicant could bring a claim against MG’s licence to burn coal which was subject to an implied condition which limited its emission of CO₂ and to restrain MG from emitting an amount of CO₂ which harmed or was likely to harm the environment in contravention of section 115(1) of the POEO Act.[3] 

Nature of the proceedings

Gray No 1- the respondent’s motion for dismissal of proceedings[4]

The applicants bought civil enforcement proceedings pursuant to s252 of the POEO Act[5] in Gray No 1,[6] seeking a declaration that the Respondent willfully or negligently disposed of waste by the emission of CO₂ into the atmosphere in a manner which harmed or was likely to harm the environment contrary to s115 (1) of the POEO Act.[7]

Applying this case to the current factual scenario, if MG had lawful authority to emit CO₂ which is denied, it could be argued that the limits of that authority are to be implied from the Environment Protection Licence. Further or in alternative, even if MG has lawful authority to emit CO₂ at the Bayswater Power Station, it is only authorised to emit CO₂ in a manner that has reasonable regard and care for the interests of other persons and/or the environment.[8]

Gray No 2-Macquarie Generation’s application for costs[9]

In Gray No 2, the court held that the litigation was brought in the public interest and it was appropriate in the circumstances that each party pay its own costs. The court dismissed the application.[10]

Gray No 3- the Applicants’ motion for leave to rely on a further amended summons and points of claim[11]

The appeal-Macquarie Generation[1]

MG appealed against Pain J’s interlocutory finding. In respect to the determination the existence of any implied conditions, Handley AJA (with whom Whealy JA and Meagher JA agreed) rejected with the notion that limits on statutory immunity from liability in tort can apply to proceedings under a statute which does not invoke common law rights.[2] It was argued that an implied condition could only exist if it was necessary, obvious, clear and consistent with the express terms of the licence.[3] While private rights generally focus on common law protection, the tort of public nuisance protects public right and can be brought in respect of public environmental harm.[4] By applying the test, the court found it unnecessary to imply the condition sought to make the licence effective and noted that the condition relied upon by the climate change action group would in fact tend to contradict the licence.[5] Instead, the Court found it necessary to imply a term that permitted MG to emit CO₂ for the reason that “a licence to burn coal would otherwise be ineffective”.[6]

Arguments relied in Court

The court held a five-fold test to determine whether a term of a contract should be implied. In determining the existence of any implied conditions, the Court held that the relevant test for the implication of conditions under contract law is to be reasonable and equitable, be necessary and obvious that it goes without saying, and be clear and not to contradict any express term of the contract. The Court of Appeal held that in this case, the implied condition does not apply, as it would actually contradict the licence issued to MG since the licence was one entitling it to burn coal. The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicants’ argument that the POEO Act automatically incorporated an Environmental Impact Statement (‘EIS’) for a project into the licence. It was held that the extent of the Environmental Protection Authority (‘EPA’) duty was to take the EIS into account and it is for the EPA to incorporate the EIS into the licence, not the court.

Further, Pain J refrained from the argument that CO₂ emitted by MG was a “waste” under section 115(1) of the POEO Act.[7] From 1 January 2002 to 26 July 2009, the emission of CO₂ from the Bayswater Power Station have dispersed and accumulated in the atmosphere. This has resulted the increased of the atmospheric concentration of anthropogenic CO₂ atmosphere and altered the environment.

In Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency,[8] it was held by the United States Supreme Court that the US Environmental Protection Agency had authority to regulate CO₂ and other greenhouse gases under the Clear Air Act because they fell within the definition of an ‘air pollutant’ under that legislation. While the Land and Environment Court[9] itself recognised the importance of the case as building on the principles of the case of Massachusetts,[10] Pain J did not however finalise his decision in Gray No 3[11] of whether or not CO₂ was a ‘waste’ for the purpose of the POEO Act.[12] One of the arguments was that MG did not have lawful authority under s115 of the POEO Act[13] concerning the disposal of ‘waste’ for emissions in an excessive level imposed by the implied EPL condition. However the Court’s rejection of the implied condition in the EPL that limits the overall consumption of CO₂ by MG rendered it unnecessary to determine whether or not CO₂ was a ‘waste’ under the Act.

Ms. Hodgson’s argument

While Hodgson put forward a logical argument, it was not as well formulated as it could have been. The applicants’ argument was based on analogy with the common law principle that while statutory authorisation will provide immunity from an action in nuisance, it will not do so if the authorised act is carried out negligently.[14] The applicants chose to argue that by virtue of the construction of s115 of POEO Act[15] MG was required to take care of its CO₂ emissions, either as an implied limitation under s115[16] or as an implied condition under its licence. Relying on this argument is problematic as proof of the offence under s115(1)[17] by applicant would require proof of the negligent disposal of waste and also proof by the respondent under s115(2) that the activity carried out by the respondent was not negligent. Furthermore, such interpretation by Hodgson J need not be done this way when the applicant implied that one of the condition of the environment protection licence was to take reasonable care to reduce emission.[18] For instance, s115(1)[19] should have been presented as establishing the primary duty not to dispose of waste negligently and s115(2)[20] should be interpreted to require the defendant to establish lawful authority to the extent of whether there was negligent to cause environment harm. Because of this, the court overlooked the analogy that could have been drawn between s115(1) and public nuisance environmental harm with the possibility of restraint the use of s115(2) defence. It is argued that the court was too quick to dismiss the applicants’ case for which s115 could have been reasonably argued by establishing an ongoing duty for corporations holding such licence to take reasonable care to reduce emissions harmful to the environment and to see whether MG has done everything reasonably possible to reduce its CO₂ emissions and whether such character of environmental harm would be attributed to its emissions.[21]

Private vs. Public right (Civil Enforcement)

In the case of Gray[1] the applicants were two members of a climate change activist group and as private citizens brought proceedings pursuant to an open standing provision to enforce pollution laws so as to require mitigation of MG’s total emissions. While private rights generally focus on common law protection, the tort of public nuisance protects public rights and can be brought in respect of public environmental harm. At common law, the attorney general can bring actions in public nuisance where such act or omission endanger the life, health, property, morals or comfort of the public or obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of their rights. Because the court has failed to apply analogous cases between public nuisance and environmental harm by operation of s115(1) of the POEO Act,[2] with respect, such point ought to be properly addressed in by the next court of appeal hearing/judgment.

It is argued that MG, during the relevant period, has indirectly altered the environment by increasing the atmospheric concentration of anthropogenic CO_2. This has contributed to global warming and ocean acidification in a manner that has harmed the environment within the meaning of s115 of the POEO Act[3] which has resulted “pollution” within the meaning of the Act. Such air pollution defined under the POEO Act[4] means that any air impurity which include smoke, dust, cinders, solid particles of any kind, gases, fumes, mists, odours and radioactive substances which has harmed the environment directly or indirectly has altered the environment in the effect of degrading the environment.

Statutory interpretation

The purpose of the POEO Act[5] is to assist in the management of the environment. In December 1996, the Protection of the Environment Operations Bill[6] was introduced with the aim of strengthening the State’s regulatory framework from pollution control to protecting the environment and to reduce pollution, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of environment protection legislation and to assist the achievement of the objectives set forth in the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995 (NSW)[7] which is consistent with the objectives of the EPA under the POEO.[8] The POEO Act[9] now replaced the pollution control legislation for which objectives has broadened by using variety of tools to protect, restore and enhance the environment to reduce pollution. Such objectives in these various pieces of legislation translate into the EPA’s corporate goals, which are to improve the state of the environment in NSW to support an environmental friendly community and to continue to improve the EPA’s organizational performance. Matters to be taken into consideration in licensing functions are that the EPA is required to consider all relevant effects of granting a licence to bodies that may pollute. CO₂ is a greenhouse gas that is not environmental friendly especially when it is produced in excess. Despite the fact that MG had a licence to emit pollution which didn’t cover CO_2, yet such a requirement clearly fit as a consideration that should be considered by the EPA. In assessing such a licence, the appropriate regulatory authority ought to consider its environmental policy,[10] the EPA’s objectives[11] or guidelines issued by the EPA.[12] Consider whether such activity or work is likely to cause environmental harm[13] by taking practical measures to prevent or to mitigate the pollution so as to protect the environment from environmental harm[14] or to restore the environmental value.[15] In addition, the EPA must consider whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold such the licence.[16] Such applicants may be granted licences either unconditionally or subject to conditions such as to limit on the types and quantities of pollution or monitor with reporting requirements so as to prevent any likely environmental harm.[17]

Despite part 3.5 of the POEO Act[18] provides a non-exhaustive list of conditions that may be attached to a licence. However if such licence condition is challenged in court, any condition imposed must reasonably relate to the subject of the licence. If such licence condition imposed by the EPA is irrelevant to the purpose of the licence grant, that is the pollution control, or if such licence condition is unclear in its application or is unreasonable according to the Wednesbury[19] principles, a court or tribunal may strike down such condition/s.[20] It is an offence for a licence holder to supply information to the EPA if it is false or misleading.[21] Conditions may also require MG, as a licence holder to provide information in relation to the pollution incident of a type for which to notify the EPA in accordance with part 5.7 of the POEO Act.[22] In addition, s117 of the POEO Act[23] provides that the emission of ozone depleting substances in a manner that harms the environment would constitute as the most serious offence.[24] For such operation of premises in such a manner to cause air pollution is guilty of an offence,[25] provided such air pollution was caused from premises within the meaning of sections [124]-[126] of the POEO Act,[26] unless MG satisfies the court that such air pollution did not cause air pollution outside the premises.[27]

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal's decision provides some certainty to all holders of pollution licences that conditions and limitations on such licences won't be arbitrarily implied. Whether CO₂ may be found to constitute a "waste" for the purposes of section 115(1) of the POEO Act[28] in future remains a live question.

Bibliographies

On 1 June 2012 the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rule (ASCR) will commence. The ASCR replaces the Solicitors Rule 2007. The ASCR rules provide a guideline for lawyers when making ethical decisions. These rules apply to all lawyers (solicitors) within Australia, including Australian-registered foreign lawyers.

First of all, lawyers in Australia have paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice which prevail to the extent of inconsistency with any other duties. Lawyers must act in the best interest of a client in any matter and be honest and courteous in all dealings when performing legal duties. Lawyers however must not engage in conduct that is not fit and proper when practicing law. This is especially the case when it can be prejudicial; diminish the public confidence or the administration of justice and to bring the profession into disrepute.

It is important for lawyers to provide timely and clear advice to assist clients to understand relevant legal issues and to make informed choices about action to be taken during the course of a matter. Lawyers however must keep its confidential duty at all times. Lawyers during the client’s engagement must not disclose anything to any other person who is not a partner, director, principal, employee or any other persons relating to the legal practice. Nevertheless, lawyers may disclose client’s confidential information only if the client expressly or impliedly authorizes to disclose, lawyers are permitted or is compelled by law to disclose; lawyers disclose the information for the purpose of avoiding commission of a serious criminal offence.

Lawyers must avoid conflicts between the duties owed to current and former clients. If lawyers need to represent two or more clients in the same or related matters where the clients’ interests are adverse and there is a conflict or potential conflict of the duties to act in the best interests of each client, lawyers must not represent one of the clients.

Lawyers with designated responsibility for a client’s matter must ensure completion of the legal services for the matter unless such legal practice is discharged with client’s consent, discharged from the engagement by the client, terminates with reasonable notice, the engagement comes to an end by operation of law. Client document here means documents to which a client is entitled. Lawyers with designated responsibility for a client’s matter must ensure that upon completion or termination of the legal practice’s engagement, lawyers may destroy client documents after a period of seven (7) years has elapsed. This means that lawyers must retain, confidentially and securely for at least six (6) years.

When you represent more than one client in a matter, client documents including but not limited to briefs, instructions, drafts, copies made for the client’s benefit of letters received, file notes, memorandums would belong to all clients jointly. Such client documents can only be given to third party with consent of all clients. Each client is entitled to have a copy of the relevant jointly-owned documents at their own expense.

Most client documents however are considered as client’s property. However please note that NOT ALL DOCUMENTS handed to lawyers will be the client’s property. Some client documents would be considered as lawyer’s property. You would need to make such distinguishment. What are considered as client’s document would be documents prepared by lawyers for the client or predominately for the purposes of the client or matter. Documents that are received by lawyers from a third party in the course of retainer and that document is for the purpose of client’s matter and was intended for the use or information of that client.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

    1990年代歐洲發生一系列食品安全危機，如狂牛症、口蹄疫等，受污染的食物嚴重威脅人民的健康，引發人民的恐慌以及對於食品安全的不信任，為了處理這些問題，國家開始重視食品安全的管控，從以往只注重食品規範的經貿層面轉向以公共健康與消費者保障為主的食品政策導向。同時，隨著科技的快速發展，食品不斷推陳出新，面對食品安全領域開始出現許多無法有確切科學證據證明的危險，專家學者決定參考環境領域引入預警原則，因為該領域同樣受到潛在危害的威脅，卻無法透過科學證明風險之存在，再加上隨著保障公共健康、環境與消費者的概念逐漸抬頭，這樣的觀念成為許多政策制定的執行目標。

    最重要的是歐洲議會和理事會在2002年制訂「歐盟一般食品法」（Regulation （EC）NO178/2002），將2000年食品安全白皮書相關內容納入此規範中，發布食品安全之一般原則以及要求規範，奠定了食品安之基礎架構，並對會員國產生法律上的拘束力，要求於2007年會員國即應全面地調整成各內國法。其中第6條（即為我國食品安全衛生管理法第4條立法參考法條），該條針對風險分析做出規範，內容提到：「

1. 為了高度保護人類健康和生命的目標，食品法規應以風險分析為基礎。

2. 風險評估應以獨立、客觀和透明的科學證據為基礎。

3. 風險管理應考慮風險估計的結果，尤其是第22條法規所提及職權單位的意見，第7條法規(1)所說明的條件，考慮其合法原因和預警原則，以達第5條法規中食品法之一般目的。[1]」

本條中提及第22條所規定之單位即為歐盟食品安全局（European Food Safety Authority, EFSA），根據一般食品法，歐盟成立了歐盟食品安全局，歐盟食品安全局成立的主要目的是提供獨立整合的科學意見，特別是在食品安全評估的部分，讓歐盟決策單位面對食物鍊直接與間接相關問題及潛在風險能做出適當的決定，以提供歐洲公民安全高品質的食物。

而條文中提及「第5條之一般目的」指的是食品法規應高度保障人類生命和健康，維護消費者權益，包括食品貿易的公平交易，以及於適當時保護動植物之健康、福利和環境。

參考：林昱梅（2015），〈論食品安全管理法制中之預防原則：以歐盟與臺灣為中心〉，《臺大法學論叢》，44卷特刊，頁1037-1152。

【關鍵字】:頂樓屋頂漏水、管委會責任、公寓大廈管理條例、無因管理

【相關法條】 公寓大廈管理條例第7條第3款、第10條、第36條第2款、民法第172條、第174條、第176條

【事實摘要】

原告甲住公寓大廈頂樓，頂樓為公用部分（甲並無加蓋），屋頂平臺因年久失修，致每逢連日降雨住處就會滲水，產生壁癌。甲向管委會要求修繕未果，自費修繕後，向管委會求償。

【原告主張】

1. 系爭公寓大廈之屋頂平臺屬於系爭大廈之共有部分，不得約定為專用部分，此部分之修繕、管理、維護，依公寓大廈管理條例第10條第2項規定，應由管委會（被告）為之。
2. 原告甲並無修繕義務，已向管委會多次反應未果，因管委會（被告）未盡其應修繕義務而代為修繕，支付之修繕費用亦為必要或有益於被告，原告甲得以此請求被告償還修繕費用。

【被告主張】

1. 頂樓住戶共有3戶，然另2戶之頂樓平台狀況良好，未有龜裂、損壞或漏水之情形發生，房屋問題起因於原告甲私自加蓋夾層屋，破壞公寓大廈原有鋼筋水泥樑柱結構所致。
2. 壁癌為台灣居家常見問題，其發生之最主要原因係充足的濕氣，大廈住戶多有發生壁癌之情況，並非僅有原告甲有此問題。
3. 依民法第172條要件規定，原告之修繕行為，須不違反本人（管委會，即被告）明示或可得推知之意思。原告擅自雇工施作系爭屋頂平台之防水工程，管委會（被告）根本未曾接受通知，已違反民法第173條規定；再者，依民法第173條規定，管理人（原告）在無急迫之情事下，應俟本人（被告）之指示。故原告主張無因管理而向被告請求給付修繕費用，於法自屬無據。

【法院判決】

1. 管委會（被告）雖辯稱系爭屋頂平台係因原告私自加蓋夾層屋，破壞系爭大樓原有鋼筋水泥樑柱結構，始時有漏水情形云云，惟查，系爭公寓大廈屋頂平台之防水層係因施作年久而失其效用。
2. 原告甲本無修繕系爭屋頂平台之義務，縱其自行僱工修繕未確實修復漏水，亦不能謂原告等應就系爭屋頂平台現仍漏水之情形負修繕之責。
3. 屋頂平台之修繕、維護本屬管委會責任，原告甲已先向管委會反應漏水情事，在被告遲未為積極處理後，始雇工進行修繕。又原告修繕系爭屋頂平台係為管理會盡公益上義務（即公寓大廈管理條例所定修繕義務所為之管理），原告因此先行墊付之修繕費用，縱違反被告之意思，依民法第176條仍得依無因管理之法律關係請求被告返還。

R v Wardle is a case of verdict insupportable or unreasonable having regarding to evidence.

1. Jurisdiction and Relevant source of evidence law.

The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (CEA), Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) (QEA) and the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (Code) apply to cases dealing with grievous bodily harm (GBH) in Queensland. Common law will supplement the QEA. This court experience was invaluable for observing the rules of evidence in real life and seeing how legal practitioners apply these in court.

2. Main Facts in Issue and the Legal and Evidential Burdens of Proof.

The Crown has the legal burden of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt (Woolmington)[1] and the evidential burden to tender evidence. If Counsel for the Defence (Defence) adduces evidence of an excuse, or is able to raise a defence on the balance of probabilities, the Crown must negate it beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to prove pursuant to s320 of the Code that Wardle did GBH and did so unlawfully. The jury must then satisfy itself beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proven all the elements of GBH and to draw inference and deduction with a reasonable conclusion as to whether the accused was guilty or not guilty.

Despite the fact that the Defence tried to adduce evidence that alleged GBH was negated by accident pursuant to s23 (1)(b) of the Code. The issue here is whether the accused did that GBH and that doing was unlawful. It was not the question of whether the complaint suffered GBH but what matters was the accused’s doing. The prosecution must negate the defence of accident, as it has the burden of negating the existence of authority, justification or excuse (Mullen).[2]

3. Role of the Judge/s and Counsel [including unrepresented parties] in calling and questioning the witness/es.

The Crown has an ethical duty to call his own “material” witnesses (Annewetey).[3] The trial process includes examination in chief by the Crown, cross-examination by the Defence and re-examination of witness by the Crown (Apostilides).[4] Here, the jury is the ultimate arbiter of fact but the judge controls what fact they are allowed to hear. The rules under which the judge does so called ‘the laws of evidence’.  The function of the judge is to direct the jury on points of law and to ensure that they are not to mislead by inadmissible evidence. The judge alone determines what evidence to accept, how important any evidence is and what conclusions to draw from all the evidence. Juries must then apply the law given to them to decide whether the accused was guilty of this charge. This statutory expression is found under s620 of the Code.

4. Any objections taken, Judicial Rulings thereupon and reformulations [outline any important objectionable questions/answers you identified even if no objection taken].

During the cross-examination, the Crown can ask leading questions in compliance with the rules in Brown v Dunn[5] to try to contradict the defence witnesses’ evidence-in-chief. In one witness’ evidence-in-chief, Judge Farr interrupted the Crown to suggest the line of questioning was irrelevant as there was not an issue of what the witness was wearing at that incident. His Honour suggested Council move on to the next question. That was the only objection taken for the whole trial.